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Articles
Hard, Soft & Uncertain:
The Guarani Aquifer and the
Challenges of Transboundary
Groundwater
David N. Cassuto & Romulo S.R. Sampaio
ABSTRACT
This Article begins with an overview of the ecology of the Guarani
Aquifer region before turning to the legal and ecological problems it
faces. Because the majority of the Guarani Aquifer underlies Brazil (with
the rest residing below Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), the laws and
policies of Brazil have a significant managerial impact. Consequently,
the Brazilian legal regime forms the focus of the first Part of the Article.
The Article then analyzes the international transboundary framework
before turning to the recently enacted Agreement on the Guarani
Aquifer. This Agreement, signed but not yet ratified by four countries,
represents a major step forward in transnational cooperation. However,
its language is so broad that it elides some of the principal management
challenges facing this and all transboundary aquifers. The Article then
looks at the legal and policy issues that local environmental problems
and climate change present for the management of the aquifer and
recommends a management and dispute resolution strategy based on the
notion of “equitable apportionment.”
The complexity and environmental importance of the region, as
well as the looming threats presented by climate change, make the need
for accurate and detailed scientific and technical information urgent and
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crucial. Yet, relying on such information to manage such a complex
natural resource also presents risks. Too often, the role of uncertainty in
risk assessment and in legal and managerial decisions gets reduced or
ignored.
Lessening uncertainty requires reducing asymmetric information.
The recent international agreement regarding the Guarani represents a
significant (albeit preliminary) step forward in this regard. Increasing
knowledge over the regulated resource demands categorizing “hard” and
“soft” uncertainties. In addition, the regulatory framework must
acknowledge the unitary nature of the aquifer while yet remaining
sensitive to differing national and local priorities. This Article reviews
the endogenous and exogenous challenges facing the Guarani Aquifer
System. It looks particularly at those within and arising from Brazil. It
then offers an international dispute resolution framework, drawn from
the United States’ doctrine of equitable apportionment, and offers some
proposed amendments to the multilateral agreement for managing the
Guarani.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Guarani Aquifer System (“GAS” or “Guarani”) is a recently
discovered, unfathomably large underground water system underlying
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina.1 Its proper management,
particularly in the coming era of climate change and concomitant water
shortages, looms increasingly vital, both to the oversitting nations and to
the world at large.2 Nevertheless, transboundary groundwater
management has received relatively little attention in international law
until recently.3 Furthermore, despite the recent publication of Draft
Articles on the Management of Transboundary Aquifers by the
International Law Committee of the United Nations,4 transboundary
groundwater law remains very much in flux. In addition, the recently
signed agreement (“Acordo”) between the four countries that overlie the
Guarani5 offers progress but no real solutions to the aquifer’s
management dilemmas.
This Article situates the managerial challenges facing the GAS
within the larger challenges arising from multilateral and multifarious
use regimes as well as by an unstable and rapidly changing environment.
1. The GAS is estimated to contain 37,000 km3 of freshwater. OFFICE FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. AND ENV’T OF THE ORG. OF AM. STATES, WATER PROJECT SER. NO. 77,
GUARANI AQUIFER SYSTEM: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUARANI AQUIFER SYSTEM (Oct. 2005), available at
www.oas.org/dsd/Events/english/Documents/OSDE_7Guarani.pdf. There is about
37,600,000 km3 of freshwater on Earth. How much water is there on, in, and above
Earth?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/earthhowmuch.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2012).
2. David N. Cassuto & Romulo S.R. Sampaio, Keeping It Legal: Transboundary
Management Challenges Facing Brazil and the Guarani, 36 WATER INT’L 661 (2011)
(building upon many ideas first laid out in this piece, which was written for a special
issue of Water International treating transboundary groundwater).
3. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 66th sess, Draft Articles on the Law of
Transboundary Aquifers, U.N. Doc. A/63/10; U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 10,
(2008) [hereinafter Draft Articles]; Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A
Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water Resources and
International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 201, 222 (2003); Owen McIntyre,
Fragmentation in International Water Resources Law: Reconciling the International Law
Commission´s 2008 Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers with the 1997 UN
Watercourses Convention, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–
8, 2010).
4. Draft Articles, supra note 3.
5. Acordo sobre o Aquífero Garani [Agreement on the Guarani Aquifer], Aug. 2,
2010, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., Ministério Das Relações Exteriores [Brazilian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs] [hereinafter Acordo].
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It argues that no multilateral agreement can succeed (for the Guarani or
any other transboundary groundwater resource) until domestic laws are
harmonized both among themselves and with ecological realities. The
Article categorizes domestic and multilateral policy challenges in light of
various endogenous and exogenous threats and proposes a management
and conflict resolution strategy. That proposed strategy builds on an
international methodology already in existence6 that is itself based on the
U.S. experience of equitable apportionment. The approach offered herein
suggests a framework that will provide increased jurisdictional heft and
enforceability to the Acordo. However, the strategy proffered here is not
specific to the GAS. It is adaptable to other transboundary aquifer
regimes with multilateral management agreements as well.
Unfortunately, only two such agreements currently exist (including the
Acordo) despite the fact that there are at least 270 known transboundary
aquifers.7
Part II of this Article describes the regional ecology of the GAS and
the endogenous and exogenous challenges it faces. It explains how these
dilemmas arise from the inability of regulatory regimes to adjust to the
cycle of hard and soft uncertainties. Part III looks at the Brazilian legal
system as it relates to groundwater. Brazil overlies eighty percent of the
GAS and is consequently the most influential of the four overlying
nations. Yet, Brazil has a basic conflict within its water laws that
impedes transboundary groundwater management.
In Part IV, the international legal challenges presented by
transboundary groundwater are examined in light of how they relate to
the GAS. Part IV examines the Acordo, a multilateral agreement signed
(but not yet ratified) by the four overlying countries and argues that,
while the Acordo represents laudable progress, it is not yet sufficient to
the task at hand. In addition to the aforementioned problems of domestic
disharmony (which make effective multilateral management impossible),
the Acordo lacks an effective enforcement mechanism and dispute
resolution procedure. Part V proposes language to amend the Acordo to
incorporate principles of equitable apportionment (drawn from U.S.
6. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, Sovereignty and Cooperative Management of Shared
Water Resources in a Time of Shrinking Availability: The Role of International Law at
114, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010).
7. Gabriel Eckstein, Hydraulic Harmony or Water Whimsy? Guarani Aquifer
Countries Sign Agreement, INT’L WATER L. PROJECT BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010, 11:08 PM),
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2010/08/05/hydraulic-harmony-or-waterwhimsy-guarani-aquifer-countries-sign-agreement/ (suggesting that there are only two
such agreements currently in existence).
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water law) and to grant jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) to resolve disputes that arise among the signatory countries.

II. OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL ECOLOGY AND
ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS CHALLENGES FACING
THE GAS
A. A Brief Overview of the GAS
The GAS—the world’s largest aquifer—underlies Brazil, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Argentina, constituting a continuous geological formation
shared by the four countries.8 It was discovered just recently, in 1996,9
and is named after the indigenous nation that carries the same name and
has inhabited the region for centuries. The Guarani contains 30 trillion
cubic meters of water, 1.2 million square kilometers, and comprises one
of the most important eco-regions in the world.10 It is integrally
connected through overland rivers (the Parana and the Paraguay) with the
Pantanal, the largest wetland in the world, which is located in Bolivia,
Paraguay, and Brazil.11 The GAS recharge zones are primarily located in
Brazil and Paraguay, and the discharge zones are in Argentina and
Uruguay.12 The aquifer’s annual recharge rate is estimated at forty-five to
fifty-five cubic kilometers of water, which represents less than 0.2
percent of the freshwater storage.13 The health of the GAS and the issues
created by its transboundary overlap present a complex management

8. Maria Lúcia Navarro Lins Brzezinski, Regulating Transboundary Groundwater:
Big Challenges for Brazil, at 1, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (DEC. 6–
8, 2010).
9. Id.
10. INSTITUTO SOCIOAMBIENTAL, ALMANAQUE BRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL [BRAZIL
SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL ALAMANC] (Beto Ricardo & Maura Campanili eds., 2008).
11. Id. at 297.
12. See EDUARDO USUNOFF, WEB-BASED INFORMATION FOR INTEGRATED WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, OF A MULTI-NATIONAL AQUIFER: THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
FACILITY
PROJECT
ON
THE
GUARANÍ
AQUIFER,
available
at
http://s162n22.fau.edu/wis3/presentations/30_Usunoff_paper.pdf.
13. Gerhard Schmidt & Fernando Larroza, Pedro Juan Caballero –– Ponta Porã: A
Groundwater Transboundary Situation between Paraguay and Brasil, at 1, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY
AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010).
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dilemma, particularly in light of the absence of precise technical and
scientific information related to underground water.
Annual extraction levels of the Guarani currently hover around 1.04
billion cubic meters per year, well within recharge levels of the aquifer
as a whole and approximately 0.003 percent of the estimated 30 trillion
cubic meters of water contained within it.14 At current levels of
exploitation, the GAS could offer its four overlying nations fresh water
for over 2,000 years.15 Although impressive at first glance, this statistic
should not undermine the importance of integrated management policies
among the overlying nations, especially in light of the exponential
increase in pressure on groundwater resources worldwide.16
Economics play a significant role in determining how the Guarani
will be utilized. Since there are sufficient alternative surface water
sources at present, it is generally not cost-effective to use water from the
aquifer for irrigation or other heavily consumptive uses. However, as
climate change shifts the amount and availability of other water, those
economics could and likely will change.17
14. WORLD BANK, REP. NO. ICR00001198, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND
RESULTS REPORT ON A GRANT TO ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY FOR
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUARANI
AQUIFER
SYSTEM
PROJECT
(July
31,
2009),
available
at
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/07/10952015/latin-america-caribbeanregion-environmental-protection-sustainable-development-guarani-aquifer-systemproject.
15. L. Amore & U. Tröger, Transboundary Guarani Aquifer System and
Groundwater Management Mechanisms, at 2, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010) (“The static water reserves were calculated as higher than
29,551 km3 (4,000 km3 +), but the deep recharge in 1.4 km3/ano, indicating the
occurrence of mining water in confined areas. The exploitable volumes were calculated
in 2,014 km3 (+ 270 km3), or 6% of SAG reserves, considering the maximum drawdown
of water levels by pumping as 400 m. If current exploitation was maintained at 1.04
km3/ano, through the 1,800 wells that reach the SAG (a total of 8,000 known wells in the
region), available reserves could be exploited by more than 2,000 years at current
patterns of consumption.”).
16. UNESCO, WATER: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD
WATER
DEVELOPMENT
REPORT
2
(2006),
available
at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001454/145405E.pdf.
17. There are already signs of stress on surface water supplies. For example, Merin
Lake, which is bordered by both Uruguay and Brazil, supplies water for much of
Uruguay’s rice production. Brazil withdraws significant amounts for irrigation as well.
See MVOTMA, Segunda Comunicacioun Nacional al Conferencia de las Partes en la
Convencion Marco de las Nacional Unidas sobre el Cambio Climatico, Unidad del
Cambio
Climatico
226–27
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cambioclimatico.gub.uy//index.php?option=com_search&Itemid=5
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Uses of the Guarani’s waters vary by region. The majority goes into
public water supplies, but significant amounts also go toward agricultural
and industrial use and to recreation (primarily thermal tourism).18 Among
the four overlying nations, Brazil relies most heavily on the Guarani.
This is due to the country’s size and demographics and to the fact that it
overlies the majority of the aquifer. Brazil’s extraction accounts for
eighty-seven percent of the water withdrawn from the aquifer,19 with the
state of São Paulo exerting the greatest pressure.20
The regional ecology, as well as the complex socioeconomic
framework, presents an array of managerial challenges. Social and
economic pressures are influenced and, in some circumstances, fueled by
regional and local zoning policies. From national zoning polices to local
land-use choices, social needs and economic demands need to be
factored into the GAS’s governance. In addition, the transboundary
nature of the Guarani adds another layer of complexity. Figure 1 below
illustrates the geographical reach of the GAS and offers an indication of
some of the socioeconomic pressures and management dilemmas that it
faces. For example, the portion of Brazil that overlies the aquifer
includes the most industrialized and agriculturally intense areas of the
country.

&searchword=Segunda+comunicacion&searchphrase=any&ordering=newest (suggesting
that as a result, demands for water from the lake are stressing the regional ecosystem, the
most likely candidate for an alternative source is the Guarani).
18. Amore & Tröger, supra note 15, at 3 (“In general, the main use of the waters of
GAS is for public supply (66%). The industrial use (refrigerators, sugar/alcohol plants,
etc.) reaches 16%, while in the countryside it is only 5%. Recreational uses in thermal
areas have reached 13%, and 100% of the water in Argentina are intended for tourist use.
In Paraguay and Uruguay more than 90% of GAS water is used to supply urban areas.”).
19. Id.
20. Schmidt & Larroza, supra note 13, at 2 (“Both in terms of population and
groundwater production Brasil has a dominating role in the SAG [Guarani Aquifer
System – Sistema Acuífero Guarani] region: 87% of the SAG population of 92 million
inhabitants live on the Brasilian territory, and about 93% of the recent groundwater
production (1040 million m3 in 2007) happens in Brasil, mainly in the federal state of São
Paulo.”). Along with the state of São Paulo, another seven Brazilian states overly the
Guarani Aquifer: Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Paraná, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso
do Sul, Goiás and Minas Gerais.
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Figure 1. Map of the Guarani Aquifer21

In the Parts to follow, we explore the regional ecology and regional
legal instruments applicable to the GAS. We begin, however, with an
analysis of the Brazilian legal framework.

B. Endogenous and Exogenous Challenges Facing Policy
Makers
We identify two types of challenges facing sound policymaking for
the Guarani: endogenous and exogenous challenges.
1. Endogenous Challenges
Endogenous challenges are those inherent to the hydrology of the
aquifer. Hydrology is by nature a complex science. When dealing with
an aquifer as large and varied as the Guarani, as well as a dearth of
21. Aquífero Guarani, WIKIPEDIA, http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aqu%C3%ADfero_
Guarani (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
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precise and consolidated scientific information regarding groundwater
resources,22 hydrology becomes more complicated still. That complexity,
coupled with the enormous geographical scale of the GAS, raises
problems of soft uncertainty. Soft uncertainty arises “where [a] precise
outcome cannot be predicted but a probability distribution can be
specified . . . .”23 For example, the hydrology of the region, while not
completely mapped, is a knowable unknown. The obstacles are, for the
most part, knowable and their potential impacts and benefits calculable.
That soft uncertainty has implications not only for instrumental
managerial policies like the jurisdictional debate highlighted below,24 but
also for groundwater policies that aim to balance development pressures
with the ecological health of the region.25 Naturally, as the science of
hydrology advances, more information will become available and the
concomitant uncertainty will abate.
Ironically, as more is learned about the GAS, new uncertainties
replace those just resolved. It is a never-ending cycle. Thus, neither
endogenous challenges nor soft uncertainties will ever disappear. A
sound management policy acknowledges and allows for this reality.
2. Exogenous Challenges
The other types of challenges facing the Guarani are exogenous.
Exogenous challenges derive from external phenomena. The
uncertainties generated by exogenous forces are often “hard.” Hard
uncertainty occurs “where one does not even know the parameters of the
outcomes.”26 Indeed, it is not even possible to know the nature of the
22. P.C. Villar, Moving Toward Managing the Guarani Aquifer: The Brazilian
Case, at 1, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010)
(noting that the complexity of the GAS “increases as groundwater depends on science to
reveal its characteristics and the risks it runs. Such characteristic hinders its political and
social appeal, since its importance and the emergency of the impacts are not perceivable
to laymen. If on one hand the lack of technical information hinders the creation of a
policy for this resource, on the other, the lack of social understanding of the theme makes
the practical legitimation of a possible aquifer legislation more difficult.”).
23. Aaron Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting, 26 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292, 296 (1966).
24. See infra Part III.A, note 51 and accompanying text.
25. See Amore & Tröger, supra note 15, at 3 (highlighting some of the risks
imposed by development pressures: “In general, main concentrated threats on water
quality of the SAG are related to risk of manmade contamination in the outcrop zones.
Regarding water availability greater risks are interference between wells and mining
waters from areas under intensive use.”); see also Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 2.
26. Wildavsky, supra note 23, at 296.
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risk. For example, climate change presents a problem of hard
uncertainty.27 The dimensions of the threat are not yet measurable and
the impacts remain mostly unknown.28 Therefore, the character of these
“unknown unknowns” prevents policy makers from determining the
scope of the risks and makes it impossible to formulate precise
managerial strategies. A precautionary approach is therefore both
prudent and necessary, although it too creates uncertainties and
managerial challenges.29 As a practical matter, soft uncertainty lends
itself to cost-benefit analysis and other risk assessment methods. Hard
27. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565,
1590 (2008).
28. See Magdalena A.K. Muir, Managing Transboundary Aquifers for Climate
Change: Challenges and Opportunities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010) (“Some key climate impacts for water quantity and quality
are saline intrusion and contamination of aquifers. Changes in seasonal and annual
precipitation, flooding, temperature and extreme weather events also affect the recharge
and discharge of aquifers, and could lead to contamination of aquifers even where there is
no water scarcity. Last, climate impacts for aquifers may be greater for coastal aquifers,
or in arid and semi-arid regions, such as the Mediterranean, Middle East and northern
Africa.”).
29. See David Magnus, Risk Management Versus the Precautionary Principle:
Agnotology as a Strategy in the Debate over Genetically Engineered Organisms, in
AGNOTOLOGY: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF IGNORANCE 251–53 (Robert N. Proctor &
Londa Schiebinger eds. 2008); Cass Sunstein critiques the Precautionary Principle by
arguing that it leads to regulatory paralysis:
The precautionary principle might seem to call for stringent regulation of
genetic engineering on the theory that this technology contains at least some
risk of causing ecological harm. But such regulation would also create risks of
adverse effects, simply because genetic engineering holds out a prospect of
producing ecological and health benefits. The precautionary principle would
seem both to require and to forbid stringent regulation of genetic engineering.
The same can be said for many activities . . . such as nuclear power and nontherapeutic cloning, simply because risks are on all sides of the situation.
Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 11 YALE L.J.
61, 93 (2002).
However, environmentalist opposition to things like GMOs finds support in a statistical
risk distribution methodology called a “power law,” which is used to measure risk in
complex systems (i.e. systems made up of multiple interactive systems). Under a power
law analysis, freak outcomes weigh heavily in the analysis as for example, when one is
measuring the likelihood of floods. So, for example, if one is graphing the average birth
weight of a puppy, one would not expect gross deviations from the mean. On the other
hand, if one were tracking hurricanes, there is the potential for radical deviation. Extreme
events are more likely in complex systems. For a useful discussion of power laws, see
MANFRED SCHROEDER, FRACTALS, CHAOS, POWER LAWS: MINUTES FROM AN INFINITE
PARADISE 103–119 (1991).
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uncertainty, by contrast, cannot be quantified and thus cannot be
contrasted or its risks accurately described.30
Managing for hard uncertainty involves acknowledging that much
of what is not known is unknown. This means that the regulatory state
must be able to adapt to emergent challenges. The goal would be to bring
the unknown unknowns of hard uncertainty into the realm of the known
unknowns (soft uncertainty). From there, it becomes possible to shift
uses and policies to address and to adapt to the new information. In this
way, hard uncertainty converts to soft uncertainty, which then can move
into the realm of the known. So, the desired progression is from
unknown unknown to known unknown to known known. Once complete,
the cycle begins anew.

III. BRAZILIAN LAWS AND POLICIES REGARDING THE
GAS
This Part focuses on Brazilian laws and policies regarding the GAS
for several reasons. First, as noted supra, the largest portion of the
aquifer underlies Brazilian territory (61.65 percent of the total area of the
aquifer versus 20.98 percent under Argentina, 8.05 percent under
Paraguay and 3.32 percent under Uruguay),31 thus making Brazilian
management practices potentially more influential. In addition, of the 92
million people living in the Guarani Aquifer region, 80 million of them
live in Brazil—forty-three percent of that country’s population.
Furthermore, the GAS spans eight Brazilian states (Rio Grande do Sul,
Santa Catarina, Paraná, São Paulo, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul,
Goiás and Minas Gerais) and more than 500 municipalities.
As discussed below, Brazilian law is not clear on the managerial
hierarchy concerning transboundary groundwater even among and
amidst the various Brazilian states. This uncertainty will have a
significant impact on the implementation of the recently signed (but not
yet ratified) international agreement, the Acordo.32 This impact is due in
part to the fact that the Acordo acknowledges the authority of each
overlying nation to manage that portion of the aquifer over which it
sits.33 As a result, Brazil’s management practices will have a
30. Soft uncertainty arises “where [a] precise outcome cannot be predicted but a
probability distribution can be specified.” Hard uncertainty occurs “where one does not
even know the parameters of the outcomes.” Wildavsky, supra note 23, at 296.
31. Brzezinski, supra note 8, at 2.
32. See Acordo, supra note 5.
33. See id. art. II.
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proportionally larger impact on the aquifer’s health and resilience.
Consequently, Brazil’s responsibility to implement sound water
management practices is proportionally larger as well.34
Second, the scope of Brazil’s activities requires different, yet
integrated management strategies. Even within one single activity, water
needs and impacts can vary as it does in agribusiness, where intense crop
use can lead to considerable drawdown in one region, whereas industrial
livestock production in another region might lead to groundwater
contamination.35 The GAS is thus vulnerable to a wide range of activities
and policies, some of which do not even necessarily implicate the aquifer
directly.36 For example, an indirect but highly significant impact on the
GAS comes from land-use law. Brazilian municipalities enjoy significant
legal and managerial authority over zoning. These local land-use choices,
all of which affect drawdown, recharge, and contamination, pose their
own set of challenges for groundwater management.37
Third, from a practical perspective, the background and expertise of
the authors38 permits us far more insight into the international and
Brazilian legal frameworks for transboundary groundwater management.
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that a truly comprehensive analysis of the
GAS must include a similar treatment of Paraguay, Uruguay, and
Argentina. Our hope is that this Article can contribute to this important
endeavor.

34. Villar, supra note 22 (highlighting Brazilian responsibility regarding the
Guarani Aquifer in light of the fact “the biggest part of the aquifer is located in Brazilian
soil”).
35. See Amore & Tröger, supra note 15 (referring to some of the threats faced by
the Guarani Aquifer).
36. WORLD BANK, supra note 14.
37. H.S.V. Totin et. al., Climate and Land Use Change Impacts on Groundwater
Quality in the Beninese Coastal Basin of the Transboundary Aquifer System BeninNigeria-Togo, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010)
(stressing that “land use and land cover (LULC) changes are one of the main human
induced activities altering the groundwater system”).
38. See Staff, Brazil-American Institute for Law and Environment, PACE LAW,
http://www.pace.edu/school-of-law/centers-and-special-programs/institutes/brazilamerican-institute-law-and-environment-baile/staff-3 (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
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A. Brazilian Legal Approaches to Endogenous Issues
Brazilian environmental law is well-developed and highly complex.
It includes a constitutional provision dedicated to the environment39 and
many other federal, state, and municipal statutes and regulations, all of
which intertwine to form a holistic legal regime. This Subpart examines
existing laws and policies in order to identify likely sources of
endogenous and exogenous challenges for the GAS.
Historically, Brazilian legislators have paid very little attention to
groundwater.40 Consequently, the legal framework for dealing with
groundwater issues is of comparatively recent vintage. However,
growing pressure over access to and protection of this scarce resource is
now forcing policy makers to address the regulatory gaps and
inconsistencies between surface and groundwater management.41
The 1988 Federal Constitution and the 1997 National Water Policy
Act established a new paradigm in Brazilian water law. Prior to 1988,
private ownership over water resources was permissible.42 The 1988
Constitution declared that the environment is an asset of common use
and essential to a healthy quality of life. This principle includes water.43
Following from this idea of the environment as a public good, under
Brazilian law, no one owns water and all have equal and unfettered
access to it.44 Codifying statutes on the nature of water as a public good
soon followed. For example, Article 99 of the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code
states that rivers and oceans are public assets and Article 1 of the
National Water Policy Act declares that water lies within the public
domain.45 This constitutional and statutory combination places water
firmly within the legal category of public assets of common use.
39. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.).
40. Antonio H. Benjamin & Cláudia L. Marques, The Water Giant Awakes: An
Overview of Water Law in Brazil, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2185, 2205–06 (2005).
41. See id.
42. CID TOMANIK POMPEU, DIREITO DE ÁGUAS NO BRASIL 41–45 (2006).
43. VLADIMIR PASSOS, DE FREITAS ÁGUAS: ASPECTOS JURÍDICOS E AMBIENTAIS 17–
18 (JURUÁ, CURITIBA 2002).
44. Brazilian law construes equal access according to the principle of isonomy,
which allows for differing capacities, needs, and uses to dictate water management and
allocation policies. See National Water Management Policy Act, Lei No. 9.433, de 8
janeiro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 09.01.1997 (Braz.), available at
http://www.oas.org/usde/environmentlaw/waterlaw/documents/BrazilLaw_No._9,433_(1997).pdf.
45. See CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 99 (2002) (Braz.); see also National Water
Management Policy Act, Lei No. 9.433, de 8 janeiro de 1997, art. 1, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO
[D.O.U.]
de
09.01.1997
(Braz.),
available
at
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However, the aforementioned statutory shift from private to public
ownership of water focused primarily on surface water. The discussion
of groundwater in the 1988 Constitution confined itself to jurisdictional
issues regarding the scope and nature of the respective managerial
authority of the federal and state governments. This division of authority
has generated considerable confusion and conflicting interpretations.
Article 20, Section III of the 1988 Constitution tasks the federal
government with managing lakes, rivers, and watercourses on lands
within its domain that wash more than one state and that serve as
boundaries with other countries.46 It also extends jurisdiction over
beaches and the territorial sea.47 It does not, however, confer any explicit
authority over groundwater. By contrast, Article 26 entrusts states with
managing groundwater.48 This bifurcated authority creates a serious
problem for aquifers such as the Guarani that underlie multiple states and
extend beyond national jurisdiction.49 Since groundwater resources (i.e.
the Guarani) can be transboundary, it is not clear whether transboundary
groundwater would fall under state or federal control.
To settle this problem, several lawmakers proposed a constitutional
amendment. The amendment seeks to resolve the inherent conflict
arising from designating transboundary resources as the province of the
federal government while placing control over groundwater resources
within state control. The amendment explicitly grants federal jurisdiction
over transboundary water, regardless of whether it is surface or ground.50
Federal control seems the proper and logical solution because of the need
for a central authority and unifying regulatory regime. As things
currently stand, it is not clear that the Brazilian federal government has
the authority to manage the Guarani nor the ability to bind individual
states to commitments made under the 2010 Acordo between the four
countries.51
http://www.oas.org/usde/environmentlaw/waterlaw/documents/BrazilLaw_No._9,433_(1997).pdf.
46. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20, § III (Braz.).
47. Id.
48. Id. art. 26.
49. This is not an uncommon problem. The U.S. often has separate regimes for
groundwater and surface water, leading to considerable confusion and legal disarray.
50. See S. Rep. No. 1.283, DE 2010 (Aug. 4, 2010) (Braz.), available at
http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t=82128&tp=1
[hereinafter
Brazilian Senate Report].
51. Villar, supra note 22, at 3 (“Presently, the legal groundwater guardianship is
performed almost exclusively by the states and with extremely different implementation
levels, even when the same aquifer is shared.”).
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The alternative—entrusting individual states, each with differing
priorities and management strategies, with controlling a shared resource
of multilateral and international significance—creates irreconcilable
federalist tension and jeopardizes international agreements and treaties.
Rather than amend the Constitution, some judges and scholars argue that
the concept of watercourses in Article 20 should be broadly construed to
include groundwater that serves as boundaries with other countries
and/or wash more than one state.52 However, this interpretation does not
enjoy widespread acceptance not least because it seems to flout the plain
language of the Constitution.
The existing text of Article 20 of the Brazilian Constitution states as
follows:
The following are property of the Union: 3. the lakes, rivers and any
watercourses in lands within its domain or that wash more than one
state, that serve as boundaries with other countries or that extend into
foreign territory or proceed therefrom, as well as bank lands and river
beaches;53

Article 26, which deals with assets falling under state jurisdiction,
states:
The property of the states includes: 1. surface or subterranean waters,
flowing, emerging or in deposit, with the exception, in this case, of
those resulting from work carried out by the Union, as provided by
law . . .54

Read together, the plain language of the two articles makes clear
that surface water and groundwater have distinct management regimes
and that groundwater pertains to the states. However, neither provision
directly addresses the issue of transboundary groundwater. From this
language and accompanying lack of guidance arises the jurisdictional
conflict over groundwater management.

52. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20 (Braz.). CID TOMANIK
POMPEU, supra note 42, at 55-58 (presenting the conflicting views about State jurisdiction
over groundwater that serves as boundaries with other countries and/or wash more than
one state in arts. 20 and 26 and of the Brazilian Constitution).
53. For an unofficial English version of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, see
República Federativa de Brasil/ Federative Republic of Brazil Constitución Política de
1988, con reformas de 1996, em inglês 1988 Constitution, with 1996 reforms in english,
POLITICAL
DATABASE
OF
THE
AMERICAS,
GEORGETOWN
UNIV.,
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/english96.html#mozTocId30141
(last
visited May 3, 2011).
54. Id.
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The proposed amendment would change Article 26 to read:
The following are property of the Union: 3. the lakes, surface and
groundwater, including those in aquifers, rivers and any watercourses
in lands within its domain or that wash more than one state, that serve
as boundaries with other countries or that extend into foreign territory
or proceed therefrom, as well as bank lands and river beaches; 55

As amended, the Constitution would confer jurisdiction over the
groundwater resources shared by more than one state to the federal
government.
Unfortunately, the proposed amendment stands little chance of
success. The sponsoring Senator had argued that the ambiguity over state
and federal jurisdiction arose from a drafting error, which the proposed
amendment would remedy.56 Ten years after the amendment was
proposed, however, another report maintained that there was no error.57
The report’s author, Senator Kátia Abreu, maintained that control over
groundwater was intentionally left with the individual states because the
legislature had intended to create a decentralized management structure
similar to the 1997 Water Policy Act.58 Under this view, allocating
control over groundwater to the federal government would violate both
the statute and the intended meaning of the Constitution.
However, the logic of Senator Abreu’s report does not withstand
serious scrutiny. A decentralized management approach only makes
sense when the resource in question is not shared multinationally. It
would be impossible for the federal government to conduct a coherent
foreign policy if transboundary negotiations were carried on by various
states whose interests may not align and which might take different
positions with respect to the management of the resource. In addition, the
Constitution does not propound a decentralized approach for every
situation, as demonstrated by the provision allocating control over
transboundary surface waters to the federal government.
Clearly, there is no philosophical issue at stake here. Rather, this is
an instance of conflicting provisions and only one logical resolution.
Multistate control over transboundary resources cannot possibly succeed.
A centralized regulatory regime is the only alternative. Nevertheless,
despite the urgency of the issue and the clear path to resolution, the

55.
56.
57.
58.

See Brazilian Senate Report, supra note 50.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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proposed amendment was tabled in August 2010 with no further action
currently contemplated.59
Meanwhile, the legislature has enacted a different set of regulations
to close the gap between the groundwater and surface water management
regimes. In 2001, the National Water Resources Council (“CNRH”)
enacted a series of resolutions aimed at integrating ground and surface
water management.60 They include Resolutions 9/2000, 15/2001,
22/2002, 48/2005, 76/2007, 91/2008, 107/2010, and 126/2011.61
Resolution 9/2000 created a Committee tasked with integrating
groundwater into the 1997 Water Policy Act and resolving compatibility
issues between surface and groundwater laws and policies.62 Resolution
15/2001 acknowledges those jurisdictional challenges and some of the
exogenous threats facing underground water and creates a general
regulatory framework that takes into account the peculiarities of
groundwater.63 Resolution 22/2002 deals specifically with the need to
rely on scientific information about the hydrology of aquifers and
requires that National Resource Plans contain such information.64 It
constitutes an important regulatory step forward to address endogenous
and exogenous challenges facing groundwater in Brazil. Resolution
48/2005 regulates the costs for the use of the water embedded in the
1997 Water Policy Act.65 Resolution 76/2007 further strengthens the
groundwater regulatory apparatus by creating a general framework
covering extraction of mineral and thermal waters found in underground
water deposits.66 Resolution 91/2008 extends the different categories
created by the 1997 Water Act based on preponderant use of the
resources to cover groundwater.67 Prior to Resolution 91/2008, those
categories existed only for surface water. Groundwater had been subject
59. For an updated status of the proposed constitutional amendment, see
PROPOSTA DE EMENDA À CONSTITUIÇÃO, Nº 43 de 2000 [Proposed Constitutional
Amendment no. 43 of 2000], SENADO FEDERAL [BRAZILIAN SENATE],
http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=45833
(last
visited Sept. 24, 2012).
60. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2213.
61. See Resoluções [Resolutions], CONSELHO NACIONAL DE RECURSOS HÍDRICOS
[BRAZILIAN
NATIONAL
WATER
RESOURCES
COUNCIL],
http://www.cnrh.gov.br/sitio/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14 (last
visited Sept. 24, 2012).
62. Resolução No. 9, de 21 de Junho de 2000 (Braz.).
63. Resolução No. 15, de 11 de Janeiro de 2001 (Braz.).
64. Resolução No. 22, de 24 de Maio de 2002 (Braz.).
65. Resolução No. 48, de 21 de Março de 2005 (Braz.).
66. Resolução No. 76, de 16 de Outubro de 2007 (Braz.).
67. Resolução No. 91, de 5 de Novembro de 2008 (Braz.).
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to a specific plan, called the National Groundwater Plan, which was then
integrated into the National Water Plan, approved by Resolution
99/2009. Resolution 107/2010 instituted criteria to be adopted for the
planning, implementation, and operation of the Groundwater Integrated
Qualitative and Quantitative Monitoring National Network.68 Finally,
Resolution 126/2011 creates a national registry of surface and
groundwater users. It is an important step toward inventorying the
demands over water resources and for providing reliable data for an
efficient management policy.69
In addition to the aforementioned regulation from the CNRH, the
National Environmental Council (“CONAMA”)70 also promulgated
water quality standards in 2005 (Resolution 357/2005)71 and
groundwater quality standards in 2008 (Resolution 396/2008).72
This extensive list of resolutions forms a useful framework for
groundwater regulation. However, it does not correct the ongoing
inability to integrate water policies with land use, climate change, and
other environmental policies with direct impact on water management
strategies. A more robust legal framework—one that relies less on
regulation and more on statutes—is needed, particularly in light of the
jurisdictional conflicts highlighted above.
The need for integration has become particularly urgent as a result
of ballooning demand for water by agribusiness. Yet, Senator Abreu
(author of the report criticizing the proposed amendment) is one of the
strongest congressional voices on behalf of agribusiness. She also serves
as the President of the Brazilian National Agriculture Confederation, an

68. Resolução No. 99, de 26 de Março de 2009 (Braz.); Resolução No. 107, de 13
de Abril de 2010 (Braz.).
69. Resolução No. 126, de 29 de Junho de 2011 (Braz.).
70. See generally Luiz Fernando Henry Sant´Anna, General Overview of Brazilian
Environmental Law, 15-SPG INT´L L. PRACTICUM 22, 22 (Spring 2002) (“The main
objective of CONAMA, which is the National Council for the Environment, is to
deliberate, within the scope of its competence, about rules and standards that are essential
to public health and safety and that are compatible with an ecologically balanced
environment, and to support, study, and propose to the Ministry of the Environment . . .
governmental policy relating to the environment and natural resources.”).
71. Resolução Conama No. 357, de 17 de Março de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO
[D.O.U.]
de
18.3.2005
(Braz.),
available
at
http://www.mma.gov.br/port/conama/legiabre.cfm?codlegi=459.
72. Resolução Conama No. 396, de 3 de Abril de 2008, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.]
de
3.4.2008
(Braz.),
available
at
http://www.mma.gov.br/port/conama/legiabre.cfm?codlegi=562.
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entity representing the interests of agribusiness.73 While the stated
reasons for opposing the amendment defy logic, one might reasonably
assume that agribusiness views state regulators as potentially friendlier
and more receptive to their needs and objectives, and thus more likely to
create a more business-friendly regulatory regime. After all, state
regulators work in the respective state capitals, while federal regulators
tend to be farther away—both physically and philosophically. Thus, it is
not surprising that attempts to allocate more control over groundwater to
the federal government have met with fierce resistance from well-funded
interest groups.
Amidst this constitutional uncertainty over groundwater
jurisdiction, states overlying the Guarani have been attempting to control
access and promote conservation.74 For instance, the state of São Paulo,
the main consumer of water from the Guarani, created the State Water
Resources Council (“CERH-SP”) to regulate and protect the State’s
water resources.75 It established restricted zones for the perforation of
tubular wells in the city of Ribeirão Preto, one of the major consumers
within São Paulo, in order to shield the Guarani from contamination.76
São Paulo also enacted a set of groundwater policies aimed at dealing
with the socioeconomic pressures arising from the region’s high level of
urbanization and industrial and agricultural activities.77 Given the
importance of São Paulo—both economically and socially—a regulatory
framework addressing groundwater (São Paulo’s groundwater comes
mainly from the GAS) is somewhat reassuring. Nevertheless, as
73. See
Sobre
o
Sistema
CAN,
NAT’L AGRIC. CONFEDERATION,
http://www.canaldoprodutor.com.br/sobre-sistema-cna/quem-e-quem (last visited Sept.
24, 2012).
74. See generally Villar, supra note 22 (“The absence of a specific federal law on
groundwater, the state domain of the aquifers regardless of their geographic limits, and
the municipal competency to manage the use and occupation of the soil generated a great
lack of articulation and freedom between the three levels of power: Union, States and
Municipalities.”).
75. See
São
Paulo
State
Water
Resources
Council,
SIGRH,
http://www.sigrh.sp.gov.br/cgibin/sigrh_carrega.exe?f=/index/index.html&lwgactw=616.
6685986030287 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
76. See São Paulo State Water Resources Council, Deliberation n. 65 (Sept. 4,
2006),
available
at
http://www.sigrh.sp.gov.br/cgibin/sigrh_home_colegiado.exe?COLEGIADO=CRH&TM
A= DELIBERACAO&lwgactw=503582.
77. Lei No. 6.134, de 2 de Junho de 1988 (Braz.), available at
http://www.cetesb.sp.gov.br/licenciamentoo/legislacao/estadual/leis/1988_Lei_Est_6134.
pdf; São Paulo State Decree n. 32,955 (June 2, 1988), available at
http://www.al.sp.gov.br/repositorio/legislacao/decreto/1991/decreto%20n.32.955,%20de
%2007.02.1991.htm.
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previously noted, a state regulatory regime cannot possibly manage a
transboundary groundwater resource effectively. Consequently, the GAS
remains imperiled.
Another example of a brewing conflict stemming from the use of
the aquifer lies in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, where the passage of
Resolution 8 in July 2009 empowers the state’s Environmental Authority
to require permits for property owners seeking to operate wells on their
land.78 However, as the agency begins rationing permits to prevent
groundwater overdraft, property owners whose title predates the 1988
Constitution could potentially file takings claims.79 Their argument
would be that they owned the water prior to 1988 and the state took it
without offering compensation. The argument against compensating
those whose water rights were expropriated arises from Article 8 of the
Water Code.80 Article 8 states that water can be privately held but that
ownership is conditioned on the waters not being declared assets of
common use. Because the 1988 Constitution, Article 99 of the 2002 Civil
Code,81 and the 1997 Water Policy Act82 all declare water to fall under
the category of common use, any claims for compensation seem
dubious.83
In addition to the already troublesome jurisdictional problem over
groundwater resources, power over land-use policies is divided among
federal, state, and municipal authorities, with the majority of power
going to municipalities. Article 30, Sections I and II of the Brazilian
Constitution empower municipalities to legislate over matters of local

78. Resolução Semac No. 08, de 6 de Julho de 2009, arts. 1 & 2, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO
ESTADO DE MATO GROSSO DO SUL de 7.7.2009 (Braz.), available at
http://www.imasul.ms.gov.br/controle/ShowFile.php?id=111055.
79. For a more detailed discussion regarding groundwater and the issue of takings in
Brazil, see generally David N. Cassuto & Rômulo S. R. Sampaio, Water Law in the
United States and Brazil –– Climate Change & Two Approaches to Emerging Water
Poverty, 35 WM. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 371, 397–400 (2011).
80. See Decreto No. 24.643, de 10 Julho de 1934, arts. 139-144, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO
[D.O.U.]
de
10.7.1934
(Braz.),
available
at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/D24643.htm.
81. See Lei No. 10.406, de 10 de Janeiro de 2002, arts. 98, 99 , DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO
[D.O.U.]
de
1.11.2002
(Braz.),
available
at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/2002/L10406.htm.
82. National Water Management Policy Act, Lei No. 9.433, de 8 janeiro de 1997, art.
1, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 09.1.1997 (Braz.), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9433.htm.
83. See Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79, at 399; see also CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL
[C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.).
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impact.84 The above-stated example of the city of Ribeirão Preto is one
such instance. Land-use policies must take into account the potential
negative impacts on overall management policies for the conservation
and sustainable use of the GAS.85
Absent a centralized regulatory regime, however, local water and
land-use management initiatives, well-intentioned though they may be,
cannot succeed. They can cause interstate and intrastate conflicts, and
their resolution may then generate new conflicts with other state or local
management policies. Meanwhile, there exists no congruity with the
national position with respect to international cooperation. Not only does
this impede cooperative federalism and international diplomacy, it makes
it all but impossible to ascertain best practices for maintaining and
sustaining the resource while safeguarding the health and preservation of
local inhabitants and ecosystems.
It bears stressing that a centralized management system for
transboundary groundwater does not foreclose individual states from
participating in the regulatory process.86 Local input regarding proper use
and management is crucial to any effective management regime. In
addition, subterranean hydrology is becoming increasingly sophisticated.
Some experts suggest that the impacts of certain uses of transboundary
groundwater resources can be entirely localized.87 For example, if a
portion of the Guarani is all but entirely bounded by impermeable rock
such that local drawdowns or contamination do not impact the larger
aquifer, it makes little sense to allocate the management of that portion
of the aquifer to federal control. In such circumstances, state and local
authorities should retain managerial authority in cooperation with the
federal regime. This synergistic approach is particularly important given
the abundance of soft and hard uncertainty presented by groundwater

84. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] (Braz.).
85. See Amore & Tröger, supra note 15, at 3 (“[T]he combination of increased
water use, lack of adequate sanitation and amendment of land use can lead to a rapid
modification of the current situation and the emergence of new critical areas.”).
86. See id. (noting that “users and local communities must be engaged on rational
use, as well as national governments, state and local authorities should strengthen the
management and protection measures of groundwater in order to prevent emerging
conflicts”).
87. See id. (discussing a study of the Guarani Aquifer System which demonstrated
that “[i]nternally, each area presents special characteristics of flows, naturally slow
through the rock pores and fissures. In the transition between the northern and southern
areas, the groundwater flow is limited by the occurrence of deep tectonic movement . .
.”).
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management.88 The next Subpart looks at the exogenous challenges
presented by climate change.

B. The Brazilian Legal Approach to Exogenous Issues
Exogenous issues are, by definition, unknown. However, the causes
are sometimes identifiable. Climate change offers an example of an
identifiable source of exogenous challenges of particular relevance to
groundwater management and water availability in general. Long periods
of drought are becoming more frequent, even in humid states in the south
of the country such as Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul.89 A major project
aimed at diverting water from the San Francisco River to the arid
northeast region of Brazil offers another example of how water
management policies in a country known for its water abundance must
now focus on avoiding water shortages.90 In addition, the ongoing
controversy over the construction of the Belo Monte Dam in the state of
Pará is fueled in part by the fact that the increasing and worsening cycles
of drought in the Amazon make hydropower increasingly unfeasible.91
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, there
is “high confidence” that northeastern Brazil “will suffer a decrease in
water resources due to climate change.”92 The report projects significant
adverse impacts on agriculture, water supply, energy production, and
health. While dry regions will become drier, there will also be changes in
rainfall patterns and runoff in traditionally humid zones. This will impact
water availability and quality and present challenges to infrastructure.93
According to a World Bank report, climate changes are expected to cause
higher levels of evapotranspiration in the Guarani Aquifer region that
will affect both aquifer use levels and recharge rates. 94 The long-term
88. As we have argued elsewhere, this synergistic approach is vital to any functional
water law regime. See Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79, at 376–78.
89. See, e.g., Carlos Caminada & Carla Simoes, Brazil Drought Threatens 10
Million
Tons
of
Corn,
Soy,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
7,
2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=a7Ks4iGegt8o.
90. See generally Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79, at 405 (providing a general
assessment of the overall impacts of climate change in Brazil).
91. See David N. Cassuto, Belo Monte: The Legal Waters Continue to Roil, JURIST
(Dec. 9, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/david-cassuto-brazil-dam.php.
92. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 175 (2008) (emphasis added).
93. Noah D. Hall et al., Climate Change and Freshwater Resources, WTR NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT 30, 34–35 (2008).
94. See WORLD BANK, supra note 14; see also COOLEY ET AL., PACIFIC INSTITUTE &
UNEP, UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING THE RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR
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implications of this and other climatic shifts are likely to be significant
and ongoing even as their full dimensions are unknown.
Brazil implemented a national climate change policy, the National
Climate Change Policy Act (“NCCPA”), at the end of 2009 that
highlights the need to manage natural resources in light of the risks posed
by climate change.95 However, the policy offers guidelines rather than
any clear plan of action. Specific regulatory measures were left to the
executive branch to enact and were also delegated to states and
municipalities. In 2010, the first step on regulating the NCCPA was
conceived. Decree n. 7,390 of 9 December 2010 was enacted with the
purpose of regulating the NCCPA.96 While the Decree provided more
specific guidance on the implementation aspects of the NCCPA, it
remains quite broad and lacks concrete enforceable rules.97
Incorporating the guidelines of the NCCPA and regulations into
existing water law presents significant challenges. The principles
embedded in the 1997 National Water Policy Act demonstrate an
emerging awareness that water management must adapt to modern
environmental realities, including climate change.98 Together with the
2009 NCCPA, principles such as the precautionary approach,
intergenerational equity, multiple use, and risk assessment now infuse
the Brazilian water regime. However, enforcement remains a significant
issue for Brazil as well as for the other three countries overlying the
GAS.99 In addition, there is an inherent challenge to managing for
unknown threats, especially when it involves acting counter to public
opinion and/or powerful political and business interests.
It is hard to imagine a politician easily convincing her constituents
to support her vote to oppose a program that will bring immediate and
identifiable benefits because she believes it will increase vulnerability to
TRANSBOUNDARY
WATERS
13
(Dec.
2009),
available
at
http://www.pacinst.org/reports/transboundary_waters/transboundary_water_and_climate_
report.pdf.
95. See Lei No. 12.187, de 29 de Dezembro de 2009, arts. 4, 5, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO
[D.O.U.]
de
30.12.2009
(Braz.),
available
at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccvil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2009/Lei/L12187.htm.
96. Decreto No. 7,343 de 9 de Dezembro de 2010, art. 1 (Braz.), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Decreto/D7390.htm.
97. See id.
98. Hall et al., supra note 93, at 34; see also Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79, at
410.
99. LESLEY MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 178–85 (2008); Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79,
at 411.
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an as yet unidentified threat that may manifest at some unknown time.
Clearly, too much caution can cause societal paralysis. However, too
little caution leaves a society unprepared and unable to respond to
emergent challenges.100 The ideal regulatory state offers sufficient
predictability to enable regulated entities to understand the parameters
under which they must operate while retaining the flexibility to adapt to
new and unanticipated challenges arising from a dynamic
environment.101
The task now facing Brazil involves fashioning an independent
regulatory apparatus that can withstand campaigns to manipulate public
opinion and undermine sound policymaking. Sound water policymaking
in a world in the midst of climate change requires implementing the
principles and guidelines already in place despite the pressures created
by large-scale development projects that continue to fail to account for
the new water-scarce reality. It also involves constructing a regulatory
state capable of adjusting to unanticipated shifts in the status quo.

IV. INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW AS
APPLIED TO THE GAS
Further complicating the challenges discussed above is the
international dimension of managing the GAS. There exists a general
legal framework for managing transboundary groundwater resources.
Moreover, there is a set of multilateral agreements of particular relevance
to the GAS. They serve as model international law for issues involving
shared water resources. This framework, however, lacks the means
through which to manage the endogenous and exogenous challenges
facing the aquifer. This Part analyzes that framework and explains why it
is inadequate to the task at hand.
100. For more information on the pros and cons of the precautionary principle, see
Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, U. ILL. L.
REV. 1285, 1325 (2011); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense to the
Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1317–18 (2003); Frank B. Cross,
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 851
(1996).
101. See David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment & Other
Contested Terms, 28 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 79 (2004) [hereinafter Cassuto, The Law of
Words] (“As the [social] system adapts, it gains complexity, enabling it to better cope
with future perturbations. A static environment/system relationship would mean that
communication as well as systemic evolution would stagnate. Stability depends on the
system’s ability to reproduce and function both despite and because of ongoing
environmental disturbance.”).
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The international legal framework for groundwater is constantly
evolving. In general, international laws regarding groundwater build on
existing rules for surface water. They include the 1966 Helsinki Rules on
the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers,102 which were adopted by
the International Law Association and laid out foundational principles
for transboundary water issues.103 This agreement was followed by the
1997 United Nations Convention on Nonnavigational Uses of
Watercourses,104 which led to the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water
Resources.105
International groundwater law also encompasses the 1986 Seoul
Rules on International Groundwaters106 and the 1994 United Nations
International Law Commission Resolution on Confined Transboundary
Groundwater.107 Further, in 2008, the United Nations General Assembly
agreed upon a resolution of principles specifically for transboundary
aquifers.108
International agreements specifically dealing with the Guarani
Aquifer include the 1969 Treaty on the La Plata Basin.109 This treaty
provides the foundation upon which the Guarani Aquifer Environmental
Protection and Sustainable Development Project110 was construed. All
the aforementioned multilateral agreements laid the foundation for the
Acordo.111

102. Int’l Law Assoc., Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki, Finland, Helsinki Rules
on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers (1966).
103. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2220–21.
104. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997).
105. The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, Aug. 21, 2004, 71 I.L.A. 337, 385
(2004).
106. Int’l Law Assoc., Sixty-Second Conference, Seoul, S. Korea, Seoul Rules on
International Groundwaters (1986).
107. U.N. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 46th Sess., May 2–July 22, 1994, U.N.
Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 135 (1994).
108. G.A. Res. 63/124, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/124 (Jan. 15, 2009).
109. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2228–31.
110. ORG. OF AM. STATES OFFICE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & ENV’T, GUARANI
AQUIFER
SYSTEM
(Oct.
2005),
available
at
http://www.oas.org/dsd/Events/english/Documents/OSDE_7Guarani.pdf.
111. Acordo, supra note 5 (citing the Treaty of La Plata River Basin and the
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development Project as consideration for the
agreement).
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A. Agreement on the Guarani Aquifer (Acordo)
The Acordo outlines basic principles adopted by the four signatory
countries and, if ratified, will represent a step forward for the aquifer’s
multilateral management while still respecting domestic autonomy. It
adopts many of the principles enumerated in the United Nations
International Law Commission (“ILC”) Draft Articles on the Law of
Transboundary Aquifers.112 Even as it emphasizes national
sovereignty,113 the Acordo also obliges signatories to manage the aquifer
in accordance with governing principles of international law.114 This
includes the obligation to not cause harm to another party or to the
environment.115 It also imposes multilateral obligations, including
protecting and conserving the aquifer in a manner ensuring multiple,
rational, sustainable, and equitable uses.116
Though imperfect, the Acordo represents a significant achievement
in the field of international water law. To date, only a handful of
international groundwater management agreements exist despite the
existence of at least 270 transboundary aquifers, which provide water to
millions of people.117 Because the Guarani, like all transboundary water
resources, falls under multiple national jurisdictions and because the
policies of the respective nations concerning overdraft and pollution
impact the rest of the aquifer, the management strategies of the four
countries overlying the GAS must be harmonized in order to function
effectively. That strategy can derive from principles of reasonable and
equitable use118 for allocation policies, as well as principles of no
112. Draft Articles, supra note 3 (precepts embraced by the Acordo include: no
significant harm, sovereignty of the aquifer state, cooperation, and the regular exchange
of information); see also Bryan A. Green, The Guarani Aquifer & International
Groundwater Law: Advancing Towards a Legal Framework for the Management of a
Transboundary Aquifer, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 361, 384–85 (2010).
113. Acordo, supra note 5, art. 2; see also Draft Articles, supra note 3, art. 3
(declaring that each overlying state has sovereignty over the part of the portion of the
transboundary aquifer located in its territory).
114. Acordo, supra note 5, art. 2.
115. Id. art. 3.
116. Id. art. 4. It is worth noting that the aforementioned objectives are aligned with
the ones found in the 1997 Brazilian National Water Management Policy Act. See
National Water Management Policy Act, Lei No. 9.433, art. 1, de 8 janeiro de 1997, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL
DA
UNIÃO
[D.O.U.]
de
09.01.1997
(Braz.),
available
at
http://www.oas.org/usde/environmentlaw/waterlaw/documents/BrazilLaw_No._9,433_(1997).pdf.
117. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2211–12.
118. Acordo, supra note 5, arts. 3–4.
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significant harm for issues arising from contamination.119 Even as the
Acordo recognizes these key precepts, its enforcement mechanisms
remain underdeveloped. This lack of a shared approach to enforcement is
understandable in light of the different national interests involved.
However, its absence could hinder future efforts to manage the resource
multilaterally.
The Acordo adopts a number of important procedural principles.
For example, the four nations agree to share information as well as to
inform their fellow signatories of any domestic initiatives that may cause
transboundary impact.120 Furthermore, Article 4 acknowledges the
importance of protecting and conserving the aquifer as well as the need
to identify areas requiring special attention, especially those near the
borders.121 Nonetheless, as is often the case in multiparty agreements, the
language of the Acordo is broad and may simply be papering over
disputed issues.122
Similarly, Article 15, which creates a multilateral commission to
oversee and manage cooperation between the parties, does not set out
any specific duties or authority for the Commission. Instead, it states that
the Commission will propound its operating regulations at a later date.
This leaves the nascent Commission without a clear mandate or the
means to enforce it. That mandate is urgently needed to provide the
means to resolve the complex dilemmas that accompany the management
of interstate and international transboundary groundwater resources.
However, the threshold question that must precede any other
managerial guidance involves determining the correct methodology for
equitably allocating the aquifer’s waters. While the sheer size of the
Guarani could lead one to presume that allocation is not the most urgent
managerial issue, that premise is flawed for several reasons.
First, until the waters are allocated, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to codify the principles of sovereignty that the Acordo

119. Id. arts. 3, 6–7.
120. Id. arts. 8–9. This approach is congruent with existing international law, as
articulated in The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Rio
Declaration of 1992 (“States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant
information to potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse
transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with those states at an early stage
and in good faith.”). See also Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a
Proposal for an Interstate Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 49, 74 (2008).
121. Acordo, supra note 5, art. 4.
122. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2197.
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purports to embrace.123 Since sovereignty over transboundary resources
is problematic by definition, if the overlying nations do not have the
means through which to quantify their control over the resource,
irresolvable conflicts become inevitable. Furthermore, the exogenous
factors discussed above will likely destabilize cooperation and generate
disagreement. The overlying nations could avoid much of that
disharmony by equitably allocating the water and creating the means
through which to adjudicate disputes arising from current and future use
pressures.
Concerns over the nature and scope of the sovereignty guaranteed to
the signatory nations in Article 2 are already the subject of vigorous
debate.124 Indeed, some argue that the mere fact that such language exists
within a modern transboundary water agreement reflects the enormous
difficulty that continues to bedevil international ground and surface
water management.125 This debate over the extent and understanding of
sovereignty is likely to remain unresolved for the foreseeable future. In
the interim, a practical solution would involve recognizing that states can
and must collaborate based on a shared vision of existing principles of
domestic and international environmental laws, as well as instrumental
principles of equitable apportionment. The following two Subparts
elaborate on the grounds (1) for the application of existing principles of
domestic and international environmental laws and (2) for a more
specific management guideline that incorporates the equitable
apportionment doctrine, which, in turn, also serves to guide adjudication
processes.

123. See Acordo, supra note 5. The Acordo notes the principles of sovereignty
expressed in Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
and Resolution 1803 (XVII). United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973); Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803(XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
15, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 15 (1962).
124. See McCaffrey, supra note 6; see also Owen McIntyre, Fragmentation in
International Water Resources Law: Reconciling the International Law Commission´s
2008 Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers with the 1997 U.N. Watercourses
Convention, at 2, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010).
125. Gabriel Eckstein, Hydraulic Harmony or Water Whimsy? Guarani Aquifer
Countries Sign Agreement, INT’L WATER L. PROJECT BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010, 11:08 PM),
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2010/08/05/hydraulic-harmony-or-waterwhimsy-guarani-aquifer-countries-sign-agreement/.
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B. Managing for Uncertainty Under the Current Legal
Regime
1. Using Existing Laws to Manage for Uncertainty
International laws and agreements regarding the GAS offer some
guidelines through which the involved countries can assess and manage
the myriad eco-systemic and political variables presented by such a vast
and multifarious resource. Inventorying uncertainties is a necessary
precondition to providing for the needs of the overlying countries.126 It is
also a requirement for a second important initiative: reducing asymmetric
information. That reduction in asymmetry requires qualified public
participation at all levels of policymaking.
Nevertheless, cooperation without clearly codified guidelines
cannot resolve contentious disputes between sovereign nations. As
exogenous and endogenous events create and compound uncertainties
(both hard and soft), signatory nations will face pressures that are both as
old as human civilization and as new as current events. For example,
development pressures and conservation goals offer fertile ground for
conflicting interests within the overlying countries. These conflicts can
lead to a tragedy of the commons (at both the domestic and transnational
levels) if not properly managed.127
On the other hand, overregulation can diminish efficiency and
impair development. Optimizing regulation presents an ongoing
challenge, but the obstacles grow larger when the commons is as
complex as the GAS. The complexity and environmental importance of
the region, as well as the looming threats presented by climate change,
make the need for accurate and detailed scientific and technical
information urgent and crucial.128 Yet, relying on such information to
manage such a complex natural resource creates risks as well.129

126. See Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment (Univ. of
Chicago, Olin Law & Econ. Program, Working Paper No. 227.5).
127. See generally Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968)
(The phenomenon of tragedy of the commons was first described in 1968 by Garrett
Hardin. The dilemma occurs when multiple individuals, sharing the same resource act in
their own self-interest in using the resource causing the resource to become depleted from
overuse.).
128. See Hall et al., supra note 93.
129. See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY
(Mark Ritter trans., 1986).
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Environmental uncertainty can never be eliminated; at best, it can
be quantified and reduced.130 Too often, however, the role of uncertainty
in risk assessment and in legal and managerial decisions gets reduced or
ignored.131 Understanding the role of uncertainty and how to best manage
it is necessary to achieve a stable regulatory framework—not just for the
Guarani region, but for all transboundary water regimes.
2. Reducing Asymmetric Information
Shared information is an often overlooked management tool.
Decreasing uncertainty requires reducing asymmetric information. This
will require policy makers to bridge the gaps among scientists coming
from different areas of knowledge as a first attempt to mitigate the
impacts of the socioeconomic burdens born by the regulated sectors.132
Local and traditional knowledge, particularly for a resource as vast as the
GAS, must also be considered. Capacity building is crucial. Users must
have access to state of the art scientific information written in language
accessible to nonspecialists. The less asymmetric the information, the
lower the degree of uncertainty, and consequently, the more likely the
regulatory decision will be beneficial.133 In this context, beneficial means
both more legitimate and more procedurally efficient, taking into account
the competing uses and needs of different regions within Brazil and
within the four overlying nations.134
With regard to the GAS, recent developments reveal a laudable
collaboration aimed at reducing asymmetric information at all levels:
international, regional, and local. However, public participation must
also play a key role. Vital information resides within traditional and local
knowledge.135 Another crucial component of a successful multilateral
management strategy (including both multistate and multinational
resource management) lies in coordinating actions and plans.
For known unknowns that create endogenous challenges, costbenefit analysis (accounting for externalities as well as noneconomic
factors) can serve a useful function at all levels, from international to
130. See generally Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L.
REV 495 (1986).
131. Wildavsky, supra note 23.
132. See generally James E. Krier, Risk and Design, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 781 (1990).
133. Gene Rowe & Lynn J. Frewer, Evaluating Public-Participation Exercises: A
Research Agenda, 29 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 512, 520 (2004).
134. See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, INCENTIVES AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
(2000).
135. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2232–42.
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local. For exogenous threats, a precautionary approach, tempered by
pragmatism and relying heavily on public participation, should govern.136
Incorporating the precautionary principle requires understanding and
managing for the catastrophic potential of low probability events with
high impacts. This involves constructing mitigation policies that navigate
dangers presented by unknown and unpredictable events, while
remaining nonexclusionary and not unduly burdening regulated
sectors.137
Incorporating these management tools into the Acordo
Commission’s mandate will require some tough sledding, but is
necessary to the enactment of balanced, responsive policies. In sum, the
Commission’s mandate must include a transparent and timely procedure
to convey scientific information to the general public, enable public
participation within the decision-making process, and enable rapid
response to environmental and societal shifts. It must also include an
effective method for allocating managerial responsibility and enabling
dispute resolution among the four nations. Those latter requirements can
best be accomplished through a procedure based on principles articulated
in the U.S. water law doctrine of equitable apportionment.

136. Article 12 of the Draft Articles requires that states overlying transboundary
aquifers “take a precautionary approach in view of the uncertainty about the nature and
extent of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system and of its vulnerability to pollution.”
Draft Articles, supra note 3, art. 12; Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 3, at 222. However,
Article 12 is concerned solely with pollution, not with general management practices.
Furthermore, as Professor McCaffrey notes, the precautionary principle is generally
relevant to situations where there is scientific uncertainty while there is “[l]ittle . . .
uncertainty . . . about the harm pollution would cause to an aquifer.” He goes on to argue
that it would have been more appropriate for Article 12 to have “enjoined states to
exercise a high degree of caution, perhaps even to take precautionary measures, so as to
prevent pollution of shared aquifers, rather than to have invoked a principle or approach
designed to deal with uncertainty.” Stephen C. McCaffrey, The International Law
Commission Adopts Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 272,
278 (2009).
137. See generally Thomas C. Schelling, Some Economics of Global Warming, 82
AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1992).
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V. INCORPORATING THE EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
DOCTRINE INTO THE ACORDO AND CREATING A
SOUND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR THE GAS
International groundwater law has already moved towards
incorporating principles of equitable apportionment into what the ILC
Draft Articles call “equitable and reasonable utilization.”138 However, as
the name implies, both it and the U.S. doctrine of equitable
apportionment are primarily concerned with allocating water rights
among interested parties.139 The focus of this Part is more on managerial
authority and dispute resolution. In order to contextualize the
international legal guidelines as well as our recommendations for the
GAS, it is instructive to briefly review the U.S. doctrine of equitable
apportionment.

A. The Equitable Apportionment Doctrine
“Equitable apportionment” is used in U.S. law to allocate surface
water between quasi-sovereign states and thereby adjudicate interstate
disputes. It is well-suited to adjudicate transboundary groundwater
disputes as well. The American system of federalism among quasisovereign states resembles, in many key respects, the relations between
sovereign nations. As Justice Holmes wrote in Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper in 1907, a state “has an interest . . . in all the earth and air within
its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”140 In
1982, the Court expanded its discussion of the sovereignty of states,
noting that they possess at least two relevant sovereign interests: “First . .
. the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal;
second, the demand for recognition from other sovereigns—most
frequently this involves the maintenance and recognition of borders.”141
138. As Professor McCaffrey notes, the doctrine was first introduced into
international water law in the International Law Association’s 1966 Helsinki Rules and
was embraced by the International Court of Justice in its 1997 decision in the Case
Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hungary/Slovakia). STEPHEN C.
MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 384–85 (2d ed. 2007).
139. Id.
140. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
141. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601
(1982). The quasi-sovereign nature of states and their consequent right to seek judicial
redress for damage to their territory also played a pivotal role in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007).
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This similarity between the right of U.S. states to seek domestic redress
for sovereignty violations and the right of sovereign nations to do
likewise in international disputes is already recognized by international
law outside of the water law context.142 For example, the Trail Smelter
adjudication of the dispute between the United States and Canada
acknowledged the responsibility of sovereign states for transboundary
pollution while also recognizing the value and applicability of U.S.
methods for resolving interstate conflicts to international dispute
resolution.143
In U.S. jurisprudence, equitable apportionment guides the U.S.
Supreme Court when exercising its original jurisdiction over interstate
disputes over surface water allocation. In other words, when there exists
a conflict between two states with differing laws, the Supreme Court
resolves the dispute by applying equitable principles tailored to
adjudicate interstate water disputes. The Court’s involvement in
interstate water allocation is more than a century old, and its foundational
principles have evolved over time. In Kansas v. Colorado, a 1907 case,
the Court rejected Colorado’s claim that the principles of sovereignty
gave Colorado the right to appropriate the entire flow of the Arkansas
River.144 The Court held that “[e]quality of right” is the governing
principle for resolving interstate water disputes145 and that states stand on
equal footing “in point of power and right” with respect to interstate
water bodies.146
In 1983, in Idaho v. Oregon,147 the Court articulated a set of applied
guidelines for its interstate water jurisprudence:


States may not preserve the natural resources within their
borders solely for their own inhabitants.

142. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 138, at 386–99 (describing equitable
apportionment and its analogues in international water law).
143. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1907, 1965 (1941); see also
Cassuto, The Law of Words, supra note 101, at 109 (“In effect, the decision introduced
the Roman concept of sic utere ut alienum non laedas (one should use one’s own
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another) to modern international
environmental law.”); Brian R. Popiel, Comment, From Customary Law to
Environmental Impact Assessment: A New Approach to Avoiding Transboundary
Environmental Damage Between Canada and the United States, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 447, 451 (1995); Martin D. Gelfand, Note, Practical Application of International
Environmental Law: Does It Work Atoll? 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 73, 77 (1997).
144. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97–98 (1907).
145. Id. at 97.
146. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922).
147. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1020–27 (1983).
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No state has inherent priority over another state with respect to
the waters of interstate streams.



For its claim to interstate water to have any chance at success,
the complaining state must show that it took affirmative steps to
conserve water as well as to augment supply.148

It bears noting that, in addition to the above principles, the Court set
a high bar for those states claiming injury over allocations of an interstate
water body.149 The complaining state must show substantial injury to its
interests as a result of the actions of the defendant state.150 Furthermore,
the evidentiary standard for proving that injury is “clear and convincing
evidence.”151 Both the substantial injury bar and the clear and convincing
evidence threshold make it likely that states will exhaust all other options
available before resorting to a court challenge.
When interstate disputes do land before the Supreme Court, in
addition to the guidelines described above, the Court applies a mix of
fundamental principles of equity and basic rules of water management
without “quibbling over formulas.”152 As articulated in Nebraska v.
Wyoming,153 those principles include (but are not limited to) considering
the:
 Physical and climatic conditions


Rates and patterns of consumption



Existing rights under state law



Nature and rate of return flows



Effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas



Extent and economics of existing uses



Damage to upstream areas as compared to benefits to
downstream areas if upstream uses are restricted

The foregoing guidelines offer a broad framework for dispute
resolution while allowing the Court to integrate whatever other factors it
deems useful in any given situation. In other words, as J.B. Ruhl points
148. See J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water
Law for a New Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 47, 50–51 (2003).
149. Idaho, 462 U.S. at 1027.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931).
153. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
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out, “equitable apportionment encompasses whatever seems relevant to a
fair division of the resource between the states.”154 This flexibility means
that it can incorporate new developments in hydrology or ecology and
new information about demands and uses and also adapt to situations
requiring new or revised principles of law.
The applicability of this regime to international interstate disputes
seems clear. As an initial matter, it makes the bar for demonstrating
injury sufficiently high so as to discourage litigation and encourage
multiple uses. It also places a considerable evidentiary burden on
complaining states (the clear and convincing evidence standard) to
support the injury claimed. This high evidentiary bar will demand
extensive due diligence and thereby encourage alternative dispute
resolution. Both of these approaches would work well in an international
context.
With respect to the GAS, the size and hydrological variations in the
aquifer mean that different states (and the various regions within the
different states) will necessarily have different use patterns. Those
varying uses will impact the aquifer in differing ways. Consequently, any
dispute resolution approach must be flexible and adaptable to these
regional variations, similar to the flexibility that is required to respond to
exogenous and endogenous managerial challenges.155 Because it arose to
address just such situations, equitable apportionment is highly adaptable
to such circumstances. The doctrine offers broad guidelines based on
equity and existing legal doctrines in the respective states while allowing
consideration of other relevant factors. No one set of legal principles is
dispositive, although all are instructive. Equitable apportionment also
allows for uncertainty (e.g. variations in climatic conditions, changes in
flows and use patterns, etc.) to play a role in dispute resolution practices.

B. A Viable Dispute Resolution Mechanism: The ICJ is
the Proper Site for Adjudicating Disputes in the GAS
In addition to a well-articulated dispute resolution process whose
authority all parties recognize, the process must be implemented by a
body that commands the respect and allegiance of all the parties, and its
decisions must have the force of binding international law. Based on its

154. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 52.
155. See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text.
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track record of effectively adjudicating transboundary disputes,156 ICJ
seems the appropriate forum for settling disputes over the GAS.
In order for ICJ jurisdiction to occur, the ICJ’s charter requires that
its jurisdiction be spelled out in the agreement between nations.
Consequently, for the ICJ to have jurisdiction over the signatories to the
Acordo, that jurisdiction must be actually inserted into the agreement.
The ICJ has already articulated the need for environmental impact
assessments as a requirement for actions with the potential for significant
transboundary impact.157 The equitable apportionment principles
articulated by the Acordo Commission should meld nicely with those
existing principles to guide the ICJ’s adjudication of disputes over
allocation. One of the principal benefits of the equitable apportionment
allocation and dispute resolution methodology proposed here is that it
can operate in the absence of a resolution to the contentious issue of
sovereignty over transboundary resources. In this sense alone, it is a
significant improvement over the current language of the agreement.
The existing framework is inadequate because it lacks both a
philosophical and methodological heuristic for mediating disagreements
between the sovereign nations that overlie the resource. Simple calls for
cooperation cannot suffice because of the competing allegiances of the
disputants. Furthermore, limiting the Acordo Commission’s mandate to
simply issuing a recommendation for resolving a multilateral
disagreement is also insufficient.158 The irresolvable nature of such
disputes leads to overly rigid readings of the sovereignty principle,159 as
well as overly hopeful expectations of multilateral cooperation.160 By
contrast, when applied judiciously in the proper forum, equitable
apportionment principles successfully negotiate a middle ground
between these two unworkable options.

156. See generally Dr. Jorge E. Vinuales, The Contribution of the International
Court of Justice to the Development of International Law: A Contemporary Assessment,
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 232 (2008).
157. The court noted that it is “a requirement under general international law to
undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in
particular, on a shared resource. . . .” Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.),
2010 I.C.J. 14, 83 (April 20).
158. Acordo, supra note 5, art. 17.
159. See McCaffrey, supra note 6, at 289 (discussing the ill-conceived and poorly
received Harmon Doctrine of the United States).
160. See generally id. (laying out the flaws in the ILC Draft Articles).
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C. Proposed Amendments to the Acordo
Given the foregoing, we propose several clauses for adoption into
the Acordo. The first is an amendment to Article 16, the second is an
amendment to Article 17, and the last is an additional paragraph to
Article 17. This additional paragraph to Article 17 is inspired by the
Judicial Settlement of Dispute Clause in the 1975 Statute of the River
Uruguay between Uruguay and Argentina. That clause forms the source
of the ICJ jurisdiction in the recent case between the two countries
regarding pulp mills on the Uruguay River. The proposed clauses are as
follows:
We propose the following language for Article 16:
Direct negotiations among the Parties over the interpretation of the
application of the Acordo must take into account existing general
principles of international water law, and the rules derived from the
equitable apportionment doctrine set forth in Article ___ herein.
When called upon to draft recommendations over disputes
concerning the interpretation of application of the Acordo, the
Commission must be bound by existing general principles of
international water law, and by the rules derived from the equitable
apportionment doctrine set forth in Article ___ herein.

We propose the following amendment to Article 17:
Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Acordo which cannot be settled by direct negotiations or via
recommendations issued by the Commission may be submitted by
any the Parties to the International Court of Justice [or the Arbitral
Tribunal].

We propose an additional paragraph to Article 17, with the
following language:
In hearing cases arising from the dispute resolution clause, the ICJ
[or the Arbitral Tribunal] should be bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, as well as by the principles of
equitable apportionment highlighted (but not limited to those) below:







Physical and climatic conditions
Rates and patterns of consumption
Existing rights under national laws
Nature and rate of return flows
Effect of wasteful uses and their transboundary impacts of the
GAS
Extent and the social and economic aspects of existing uses
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Damage to one (or more) neighboring countries as compared to
benefits to one (or more) neighboring countries if the prior uses are
restricted

It bears noting that adjudication before the ICJ or an Arbitral
Tribunal would only become an option after exhausting the mandatory
mediation processes imposing direct negotiation and then
recommendations issued by the Acordo Commission. In both cases, the
mediation procedure would be guided by existing principles of
international and domestic law regarding groundwater, and more
substantively, by the rules derived from an adapted equitable
apportionment doctrine. If mediation cannot resolve a given dispute, the
adjudication clause would then apply. The adjudication clause institutes
ICJ’s jurisdiction.161
A second best approach presupposes that the arbitral clause in
Article 19 of the Acordo remains unchanged. The second part then
creates the framework through which to implement equitable
apportionment of the GAS via the mandate for the ICJ or to the
Commission as is currently articulated in Article 15 of the Acordo. This
approach would indicate a set of rules accepted by the parties that would
guide the ICJ’s ruling in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of the

161. Annex to U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last visited
Sept. 24, 2012) (“1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in
treaties and conventions in force. 2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any
time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement,
in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in
all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of
international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made
for the breach of an international obligation. 3. The declarations referred to above may be
made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain
states, or for a certain time. 4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the
Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and which are still in force shall
be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they
still have to run and in accordance with their terms. 6. In the event of a dispute as to
whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the
Court.”).
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ICJ.162 The same authority allows for the formation of an Arbitral
Tribunal.

VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the legal framework for the Guarani represents progress but
also highlights the challenges and risks ahead. Brazil’s constitutional
predicament with respect to transboundary groundwater, as well as other
domestic legal hurdles, complicates an already difficult multilateral
management process. Overcoming these challenges and effectively
managing the Guarani will require both domestic legal reform, as well as
increased attention to hard and soft uncertainty questions. Once
categorized, policy makers must allow for public participation through
the promotion of awareness, capacity building, community involvement,
and traditional knowledge. In addition, the regulatory framework must
acknowledge the unitary nature of the aquifer while still remaining
sensitive to differing national and local priorities. This challenge, faced
by every transnational water negotiation, looms particularly large with
the GAS because of the size and importance of the resource and because
of its impact on other sensitive and protected regions.
The Acordo is a strong beginning to the creation of a multilateral
management regime, but it cannot yet function effectively. Significant
changes in both the domestic hydro-legal regimes of the overlying
countries remain necessary, as is the emendation of the Acordo itself.
While this Article confines itself to the domestic groundwater regime of
Brazil, similar attention must be paid to the regimes of Argentina,
Uruguay, and Paraguay. Nevertheless, given Brazil’s size and dominance
of the aquifer region, if and when it harmonizes its groundwater laws and
brings transboundary groundwater under federal jurisdiction, that
concordance will constitute a significant step toward effective
multilateral management.
Finally, the Acordo itself must be strengthened to include a mandate
for the Commission it creates, and to create an effective dispute
162. Id. art. 38 (“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.”).
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resolution process. We have proposed a process that draws on existing
principles of international groundwater law (equitable and reasonable
utilization) while hearkening back more strongly to the predicates of that
doctrine, which lie within the principle of equitable apportionment. We
argue that the Acordo should be amended to create jurisdiction for the
ICJ over multilateral disputes in the GAS and that those disputes be
resolved according to principles laid out in the jurisprudence of equitable
apportionment.
Justice Holmes wrote that “a river is more than an amenity, [sic] it
is a treasure.”163 The same is true—perhaps even truer—of the Guarani
Aquifer. The proposals offered here represent part of an ongoing process
to safeguard this treasure against the pressures and challenges of a
changing world and climate while allowing its sustainable use in
perpetuity. There are uncertain days ahead for the GAS and for the four
countries that manage it. But uncertainty has always been with us and
will never disappear. The goal is not to eradicate uncertainty but rather to
formulate an effective strategy for managing it.

163. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).

